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THE 1997 SCOTTISH REFERENDUM: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
Charles Pattie, David Denver, James Mitchell and Hugh 
Bochel   
Referendums are rare events in the United Kingdom. Only one UK-wide 
referendum has been held - on membership of the European Community (as 
it then was) in 1975 - and before 1997 there had been only three other 
significant referendums: in 1973, in Northern Ireland, on the constitutional 
position of the province, and in 1979, in Scotland and Wales, on proposals 
for devolution. Thus the scarcity of cases available for study in itself makes 
the 1997 referendum on a Scottish parliament worthy of close attention. In 
addition, however, the fact that Scottish voters were asked to vote on, not 
one, but two questions - whether or not they were in favour of a Scottish 
parliament and whether such a parliament should have tax-varying powers - 
made the Scottish referendum unique among the (admittedly few) 
referendums that have been held in Britain.  
Referendums provide a rare opportunity for analysis of the voting behaviour 
of the mass electorate in a context which is different from that of a normal 
election. Little is known about how voters respond in this relatively 
unfamiliar context. Although full investigation of this question must await 
the results of survey studies we can make a start by analysing the referendum 
results themselves. At the time of writing more referendums are in prospect: 
on the government of London, on electoral reform, and on membership of the 
single European currency. Analysis of the Scottish vote gives us a rare 
glimpse into the workings of a referendum in Britain, therefore, at a time 
when it seems likely that the device - once believed to be contrary to the 
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spirit of the British Constitution - will be used more frequently in future. 
Before turning to our analysis, however, we provide a brief account of the 
background to the referendum. 
SCOTLAND AND HOME RULE: THE ROAD TO THE 
REFERENDUM 
For much of the period since 1945 the debate over Scottish home rule has 
been intertwined with the resurgence of political nationalism in the shape of 
the Scottish National Party. The rapid growth in the SNP vote in the late 
1960s and early 1970s put pressure on governments at Westminster to bring 
forward plans for devolution. Both Labour and the Conservatives made such 
plans, but it was the Labour government of 1974-79 which produced 
proposals providing for an elected assembly in Edinburgh, with powers over 
most aspects of Scottish domestic policy, but with no tax-raising powers. A 
referendum was arranged for 1979 to allow the Scottish electorate to deliver 
their verdict on Labour's plans. The decision to hold a referendum was in part 
to appease anti-devolutionists in the Parliamentary Labour Party, and during 
the passage of the Referendum Bill an amendment, proposed by a Labour 
backbencher, was passed stipulating that, for devolution to go ahead, the 
proposals would have to be backed by 40% of the eligible electorate rather 
than a simple majority of those voting. 
For a variety of reasons support for devolution ebbed away in the run-up to 
the referendum and the result was disappointing for the 'Yes' camp (see 
Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1980). Only 51.6% of those who voted were 
in favour and this represented only 32.5% of the eligible electorate. 
Moreover, in five of the nine regions and two of the three islands areas a 
majority of voters voted 'No'. Labour's devolution plans were lost and, in the 
aftermath, SNP MPs helped to eject the government by opposing it in a vote 
of confidence. The Conservatives won the resulting general election, and 
went on to hold office for the following 18 years. Throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s Scottish home rule was resolutely off the Westminster agenda. 
Within Scotland pressure for a devolved parliament began to grow again, 
however, and was reflected in the electoral performance of the pro-
devolution parties, opinion polls on the constitutional issue and the setting up 
of the Scottish Constitutional Convention in 1989. Perhaps the most 
important motor of pro-devolution sentiment, however, was the 
Conservatives' continued domination of the British political scene. Already a 
minority in Scottish politics in 1979, the Conservatives' Scottish base 
The 1997 Scottish Referendum: an Analysis of the Results 
 
declined at each election thereafter (with the limited exception of 1992). But 
the party did well enough in England to continue to form the government. 
Scottish voters perceived themselves as being governed by a party which 
they had rejected. In addition, a whole series of specific events such as the 
imposition of the poll tax a year before its introduction in England, the 
closure of the Ravenscraig steelworks, a proposal to discontinue the London 
to Fort William sleeper train, and so on, appeared to indicate a remarkable 
insensitivity to Scottish sensibilities. Added to this, Mrs Thatcher, Prime 
Minister for most of the period, was very unpopular among Scottish voters 
(Mitchell and Bennie 1996: Bennie et al 1997).  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, devolution (without a further referendum) 
remained Labour's policy. For the Conservatives, however, John Major 
continued his predecessor's opposition to a Scottish parliament. Indeed, he 
made that opposition a centrepiece of his campaign in the 1992 election, 
arguing later that it was an important factor both in the Conservatives' (very 
small) recovery in Scotland and in their overall victory. 
After the 1992 election, however, the Conservative government soon ran into 
trouble on a variety of fronts, and its popularity ebbed away. Labour 
established a strong and persistent lead in British national opinion polls and, 
as it seemed increasingly likely that Labour would form the next government, 
the prospect of a Scottish parliament being established drew nearer. In 1995, 
however, Labour came under serious attack on the issue from the Scottish 
Conservatives when Michael Forsyth became Scottish Secretary. Forsyth 
focused on the tax varying powers in Labour's proposals, the 'tartan tax' as he 
called it. Labour struggled to find an effective response and there was a fear 
that New Labour's carefully constructed image as a low tax party might be 
tarnished. In the face of considerable controversy within Scotland, therefore, 
the Labour leader, Tony Blair, announced in 1996 that a referendum would 
be held consisting of two questions, one on the principle of devolution and 
the other on tax varying powers. This was designed, firstly, to give added 
legitimacy to the Scottish parliament proposed by Labour and, secondly, to 
remove the potentially damaging issue of tax from the forthcoming general 
election campaign. Labour could now respond that it would be up to the 
Scottish people to decide whether they wanted the parliament to have the 
power to raise (or lower) taxes. Moreover, if they made that choice, it would 
again be up to the Scottish electorate to decide whether and how the power 
should be used, by voting for appropriate candidates in elections to the 
parliament. 
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The devolution debate featured prominently in the 1997 general election 
campaign in Scotland. Once again, John Major attempted to make the future 
of the United Kingdom a centrepiece of his campaign but his party went 
down to its worst twentieth century defeat, losing all of its seats in Scotland. 
The new Labour government, elected on 1 May moved quickly to implement 
its plans for devolution. A white paper outlining proposals for a Scottish 
parliament was published in July and a referendum on the issue organised for 
11 September 1997. 
TURNOUT IN THE REFERENDUM 
During the referendum campaign and, indeed, on referendum night itself, 
there was a good deal of journalistic speculation about the likely turnout in 
the referendum and about how the turnout should be interpreted. A low 
turnout, it was feared, would dent the legitimacy of the new parliament even 
if there were a 'Yes' majority. The unasked question in most discussions of 
turnout (both before and after the referendum), however, is what levels of 
turnout would count as 'low' (or 'satisfactory' or 'high'). Indeed, much of this 
comment revealed a rather sketchy knowledge of turnout levels and patterns 
of turnout variation in different kinds of elections. The national turnout in the 
referendum was 60.4%. This figure is put into context in table 1, which 
shows turnouts in Scotland at various kinds of elections and at the three 
referendums held so far. The turnout in 1997 was very close to those 
recorded in the two previous referendums. Indeed, the electoral register on 
which the 1997 figure is based was more than six months older than that used 
in 1979 and, when a standard adjustment is made to take account of deaths 
and electors who have moved since the compilation of the register, the 
turnouts in the two referendums were almost identical. Turnout at all three 
referendums was, of course, lower than in the last general election. But this 
reflects a general phenomenon. In all countries referendum turnouts tend to 
be lower than the turnout in parliamentary elections (Butler and Ranney 
1994). This may be because the important cues of party loyalty to guide 
voters are frequently absent in referendums. On the other hand the 
referendum turnout was much greater than the Scottish turnout in local 
elections or in elections to the European parliament. Turnout in the 
referendum was, then, about as good as could have been expected. 
The national turnout figure masked quite wide variations across the country, 
however. The average turnout in the 32 local authority areas (for which the 
results were announced separately) was 61.5% (see Appendix). On the 
whole, most local authorities had turnouts close to this, as reflected in the 
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small standard deviation of 4.9%. The highest turnouts were in East 
Dunbartonshire (72.7%), East Renfrewshire (68.2%) and South Ayrshire 
(66.7%), and the lowest were in Shetland (51.5%), Glasgow (51.6%), Orkney 
(53.5%), Aberdeen (53.7%), Dundee (55.7%) and Western Isles (55.8%). 
Table 1 
Turnout in elections and referendums in Scotland 
Elections % Referendums % 
General election 1997 71.4 European Community 
1975 
61.7 
Local elections 1995 44.9 Devolution 1979 63.8 
European election 
1994 
37.9 Devolution 1997 60.4 
 
It might be thought that variations in referendum turnout across Scotland 
would reflect variations in levels of support for devolution, with low turnout 
occurring in areas where people were most indifferent to devolution and 
higher turnouts being in areas where there was more enthusiasm. But the 
results provide no support for such an interpretation. The correlation between 
turnout at the referendum and the percentage voting 'Yes' on the first 
referendum question, support for a Scottish parliament, is very weak (0.04). 
There was, then, no relationship between turnout and support for a 
parliament. Areas in which a higher than average proportion of voters were in 
favour of a parliament were just as likely (or unlikely) to have a high turnout 
as areas in which a lower than average proportion were in favour. 
In fact, the pattern of turnout variation was very similar to the patterns which 
occur in general and local elections. It was higher in more middle class and 
affluent areas than it was in more working class and poorer areas, and it was 
notably lower in inner cities. In general elections these broad social 
differences are overlain by political considerations - most obviously the 
marginality of constituencies and the consequent variations in local campaign 
effort put in by the parties. Such considerations were absent, of course, in the 
referendum (and may help explain why turnouts in referendums are usually 
lower than in general elections). Table 2 shows simple correlations between 
referendum turnout and some social and political features of the local 
authority areas. As expected, turnout was higher where there were more 
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professional and managerial workers and lower where there were more 
manual workers. Although the coefficients for % owner occupiers and % 
council tenants are not statistically significant (the relatively small number of 
local authority areas means that a correlation has to be strong to achieve this) 
they are in the expected direction, as is that for % private tenants. Turnout 
also tended to be lower (although the correlation coefficient does not quite 
achieve statistical significance) in more agricultural areas, probably reflecting 
the traditionally poor turnout in North East Scotland. This is also likely to 
explain the negative correlation between turnout and Liberal Democrat 
performance in the 1997 general election as the latter scored well in 
Aberdeenshire and the Highlands. There is no significant association with the 
performances of the other parties in the 1997 election, however. The 
strongest correlation of all is between turnout in the referendum and turnout 
in the 1995 local elections (0.574). This emphasises the extent to which 
'normal' electoral behaviour was repeated at the referendum. (See Appendix.) 
Table 2  
Correlations with Local Authority Turnout in the Referendum 
% professional and 
managerial 
0.360* Turnout in local 
elections 1995 
0.574* 
% manual workers -0.428* % Conservative 1997 0.302 
% owner occupiers 0.271 % Labour 1997 0.242 
% council tenants -0.112 % Lib Dem 1997 -0.394* 
% private tenants -0.367* % SNP 1997 0.042 
% employed in 
agriculture 
-0.309   
Note: * = statistically significant, p < .05. 
There was, then nothing strikingly unusual in the pattern of turnout in the 
referendum across the country. It was lower where we would expect voters to 
be relatively reluctant to vote on any occasion, and higher where we would 
expect voters to be regular participants in elections. As we noted above, 
variations in the extent and intensity of local campaigning on referendum 
turnout might also explain variations in turnout. Recent work on constituency 
campaigning at general elections suggests that campaign effort plays an 
important part in mobilising support for political parties (Denver and Hands 
1997). The local campaign might well make a difference in a referendum, 
too, with active campaigns increasing turnout. Indeed, one could argue on a 
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priori grounds, that, with party loyalty not being so important, local 
campaigning might matter more in referendums than in elections. Anecdotal 
evidence seems to bear out this interpretation: one further reason for the very 
low turnout in Glasgow, for example, might be that very little local 
campaigning seems to have taken place there.  
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Table 3 
Support For a Scottish Parliament in Opinion Polls 
Should there be a Scottish parliament? 
Company Sponsor Publication Yes No  Don't  know 
   % % % 
System 3 Herald June 1997 64 21 15 
System 3 Herald July 1997 68 21 10 
System 3 Herald August 1997 65 19 16 
System 3 Herald 2/9/97 61 23 18 
NOP Sunday 
Times 
7/9/97 63 21 16 
ICM Scotland on 
Sunday 
7/9/97 60 25 15 
MORI STV 8/9/97 67 22 11 
System 3 Herald 10/9/97 61 20 19 
ICM Scotsman 10/9/97 63 25 12 
Should a Scottish Parliament have tax-varying powers? 
Company Sponsor Publication Yes No  Don't  know 
   % % % 
System 3 Herald June 1997 53 28 19 
System 3 Herald July 1997 56 26 18 
System 3 Herald August 1997 54 27 19 
System 3 Herald 2/9/97 47 32 21 
NOP Sunday 
Times 
7/9/97 51 34 15 
ICM Scotland on 
Sunday 
7/9/97 45 38 17 
MORI STV 8/9/97 51 32 17 
System 3 Herald 10/9/97 45 31 24 
ICM Scotsman 10/9/97 48 40 12 
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SUPPORT FOR THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 
In the run-up to the 1979 referendum opinion polls gave supporters of a 
Scottish Assembly grounds for optimism about the outcome. Bochel and 
Denver suggested at the time that 'in any election a political party would feel 
very confident if opinion was as strongly in its favour as it seems to be for 
the Assembly' (Bochel, Denver and Macartney 1981, p.143). In the event, the 
'Yes' lead was steadily whittled away as the campaign progressed. In 1997 
things were different. Table 3 shows the results of Scottish opinion polls on 
the questions posed in the referendum. Once again support for a parliament 
was initially strong but this time there was no significant slippage as 
referendum day approached. If 'don't knows' are excluded (as is normal 
practice) then all of the polls listed reported that more than 70% of the 
electorate were in favour of a Scottish parliament (the average for all nine 
being 74% - exactly as the result turned out). Support for tax-varying powers 
was less enthusiastic and here there is some evidence of slippage. When 
'don't knows' are excluded, the polls from July to August averaged 67% in 
favour; the first four during September averaged 58.5%; the two published on 
10 September averaged 57%. In the event (see table 4), support in the 
referendum for tax-varying powers was stronger than the September polls 
suggested. 
Table 4 shows the final results of the referendum for both questions. Support 
for a Scottish parliament was overwhelming, with almost three-quarters of all 
those who voted endorsing the proposal. This was in marked contrast to the 
1979 referendum result, when the majority was very narrow. Furthermore, 
the 1997 result was more emphatic in other ways too. While the '40% of the 
electorate' rule imposed in 1979 did not apply in 1997, it provides a useful 
yardstick with which to compare the two votes. As we have seen, although a 
bare majority of voters supported a parliament in 1979, this fell well short of 
40% of electors. In 1997, however, the 40% hurdle was easily cleared, 44.7% 
of the electorate voting in favour. Moreover, if the 'eligible electorate' is 
adjusted in the same way as in 1979 (the electorate was reduced by 90,002 to 
take account of deaths, those under voting age on referendum day, prisoners 
and those registered in two different places) then an estimated 45.7% voted 
Yes. Furthermore, whereas in 1979 a majority of the regions had been 
opposed to devolution, in 1997 all regions voted in favour. A regional 
comparison between the two referendums is given in table 5 (the 1997 local 
authorities being combined into the old regional council areas for this 
purpose). Even in the most lukewarm area, Orkney, a clear majority (57.3%) 
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voted in favour of a parliament. At the other extreme, more than three-
quarters of the voters supported a parliament in the populous regions of 
Strathclyde, Central and Fife as did almost 80% of voters in the Western 
Isles. The size of the Yes vote suggests that, in John Smith's phrase, the 
desire for a parliament in Edinburgh was indeed the 'settled will' of the 
Scottish people. 
Table 4 
The Referendum Results 
 % of votes cast % of electorate % of adjusted electorate 
Q1. Support a Scottish parliament 
Yes 74.3 44.7 45.7 
No 25.7 15.5 15.8 
Q2. Support tax-varying powers 
Yes 63.5 38.1 38.9 
No 36.5 21.9 22.4 
Turnout  60.4 61.8 
Note: the figures under 'adjusted electorate' are comparable with those for the 1979 
referendum when the electorate figure was reduced by excluding electors who could 
not vote. 
But while a majority of voters in all parts of the country supported the 
parliament, there were still significant variations across regions. As table 5 
reveals, the regions opposed to an Assembly in 1979 were also those which 
were least strongly in favour of a parliament in 1997. The regions which had 
given greatest support to the 1979 proposals were still the strongest 
supporters in 1997. The country as a whole had moved in favour of a Scottish 
parliament, but the geography of relative support and scepticism remained 
unaltered.  
The fact that in 1997 results were announced for 32 local authority areas 
rather than 12 'regions' allows more scope for analysis of the votes. In these 
areas, the percentage voting 'Yes' on the first referendum question ranged 
from 57.3% in Orkney to an astonishing 84.7% in West Dunbartonshire. Six 
areas recorded Yes votes of 80% and above while six (in addition to Orkney 
and Shetland) were lower than 65%. What explains these variations? 
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Given the polarised and politicised nature of the devolution campaign, with 
Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and the SNP all in the Yes camp, and the 
Scottish Conservatives almost alone on the No camp, we would expect levels 
of support for the parliament in the local authorities to be closely related to 
the strength of the parties in the areas concerned. This is certainly true as far 
as Labour and the Conservatives are concerned. As table 6 shows, Labour's 
share of the vote in the general election correlates strongly positively and the 
Conservatives' share strongly negatively with the percentage voting 'Yes' on 
the first question in the referendum. The better the Conservatives did in the 
general election, the lower was the Yes vote for a parliament. The better 
Labour did, the higher the Yes vote. In short, Labour areas were more 
strongly in favour of a parliament than Conservative areas. 
Table 5  
Referendum Results by Region 1979 and 1997 
Region 1979 Yes  1997 Yes (Q1) 1997 Yes (Q2) 
 %  % % 
Western Isles 55.8  79.4 68.4 
Central 54.7  76.3 65.9 
Strathclyde 54.0  78.1 67.7 
Fife 53.7  76.1 64.7 
Highland 51.0  72.6 62.1 
Lothian 50.1  74.5 63.7 
Tayside 49.5  67.6 57.0 
Grampian 48.3  67.6 55.6 
Borders 40.3  62.8 50.7 
Dumfries & 
Galloway 
40.3  60.7 48.8 
Orkney 27.9  57.3 47.4 
Shetland 27.1  62.4 51.6 
SCOTLAND 51.6  74.3 63.5 
Note: regions are listed in descending order of the 'Yes' vote in 1979. 
It is important to remember that the analysis of results for different areas does 
not allow us to make inferences about the behaviour of individuals within 
The 1997 Scottish Referendum: an Analysis of the Results 
 
those areas. This is illustrated by the apparently surprising fact that the 
stronger the support for the Liberal Democrats in the general election the 
weaker was the Yes vote in the referendum (correlation of -0.578). After all 
the Liberal Democrats are long-time proponents of devolution and the 
Scottish Liberal Democrat leadership figured prominently in the Yes 
campaign. But Liberal Democrat support in Scotland is concentrated in the 
Borders, the rural North East and the Highlands and these are also the areas 
where what remains of Conservative support is concentrated. The negative 
correlation does not necessarily mean that Liberal Democrat voters were 
lukewarm in their support for a parliament - we require survey data to test 
that interpretation - but simply that areas of relative Conservative strength 
were also conservative in their approach to the question of Scotland's 
constitutional status. By the same token, the absence of any significant 
association between SNP strength and the size of the Yes vote should not be 
interpreted as meaning that SNP supporters were hesitant about voting Yes. It 
reflects the fact that in the 1997 general election the SNP did well in some 
traditionally Conservative areas but also quite well in traditionally Labour 
areas. 
Table 6  
Correlations with % Yes (first question) in the Referendum 
% professional and 
managerial 
-0.517* % Conservative 
1997 
-0.723* 
% manual workers 0.312 % Labour 1997 0.826* 
% owner occupiers -0.629* % Lib Dem 1997 -0.578* 
% council tenants 0.733* % SNP 1997 0.065 
% private tenants -0.692*   
% employed in 
agriculture 
-0.727*   
% Scottish born 0.729*   
Note: * = statistically significant, p < .05. 
Table 6 also shows the correlations between the percentage voting Yes and 
some aspects of the social make-up of local authority areas. Given the 
relationships with party strength it is not surprising to find that support for 
the Scottish parliament was lower in more middle-class areas (negative 
correlations with % professional and managerial and % owner occupiers) and 
higher in more working class areas (positive correlations with % manual 
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workers and % council tenants). There is also a strong negative correlation 
with % employed in agriculture. This may reflect an anti-Central belt element 
in the voting. In both 1979 and 1997 some concern was expressed in more 
rural and remote parts of Scotland that a Scottish parliament would be 
dominated by politicians from the Central belt - in particular by Labour 
members from the urban West of Scotland - and that rural interests and 
concerns would be swamped. This interpretation is supported by our analysis 
since even when we take account of Conservative strength and the proportion 
of middle class voters there is still a significant negative association between 
the level of agricultural employment and the size of the Yes vote. 
Finally, there is a significant relationship between how 'Scottish' an area is 
(as indicated by the proportion of the population born in Scotland) and the 
size of the Yes vote. Although 'Scottishness' overlaps with some of our other 
measures it seems that the more Scottish a community the greater was the 
support for the parliament. This may appear an obvious result but it suggests 
that the Yes campaign drew support from areas where a Scottish identity is 
likely to be more common and, possibly, more intense. 
In sum, then, analysis of the local authority results shows that there was a 
distinct pattern to voting in the referendum. Primarily, we would suggest, the 
pattern is party-based, reflecting the traditional support for Labour and the 
Conservatives. But there was a clear social division in levels of enthusiasm 
for devolution and there is also evidence of a rural-urban difference. In 
addition, areas which are more homogeneously Scottish were more strongly 
in favour of a parliament than those which are relatively heterogeneous. (See 
Appendix.) 
SUPPORT FOR TAX-RAISING POWERS 
There was little real surprise at the victory of the Yes camp on the first 
question in the referendum. The only doubt was over the extent of the 
winning margin. But the result on the second question, on whether the new 
Scottish parliament should have limited tax varying powers, was less certain. 
Some saw this as the Achilles' heel of Labour's proposals. The conventional 
wisdom of voting studies, after all, is that the electorate does not vote for tax 
rises (as George Bush found to his cost in the 1992 American presidential 
election). But as we have seen (table 4) the referendum produced another 
clear majority in favour of giving the parliament tax powers (63.5%). While 
the majority was clear, it would not have been enough to cross the 1979 
threshold of support from 40% of the electorate - whether or not the 
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electorate figure is adjusted in the same way as in 1979 - since the proposal 
was supported by 38.1% of the Scottish electorate (38.9% when adjusted). 
Only two of the old Scottish local government regions, Central and 
Strathclyde, crossed the 40% threshold. In Orkney and Shetland, only around 
a quarter of the electorate voted in favour of tax-raising powers. 
The pattern of voting on tax varying powers across local authorities was 
almost identical to the pattern of voting on having a Scottish parliament. The 
correlation between the two votes is virtually perfect (0.986). The same sorts 
of areas which voted heavily in favour of a parliament also voted heavily in 
favour on the tax powers question. But, of course, the overall level of support 
for tax powers was 10.8 percentage points lower and this decline was 
remarkably uniform across the country. The largest drop in the Yes 
percentage between the two questions was in Renfrewshire (-15.5). This may 
have been a consequence of the publicity surrounding alleged corruption 
among Labour councillors in Paisley, with some voters apparently being 
unwilling to trust politicians to handle their money. The smallest drop was in 
Glasgow (-8.6). When we calculate the difference between the two votes as a 
percentage of the Yes vote - thus getting an estimate of the proportion of 
'Yes-No' voters (assuming that few cast a 'No-Yes' vote) we find that the 
figure is 14.8%. Again this was lowest in Glasgow (10.6%) but this time it 
was highest in Moray (22.1%). 
It is by no means clear that the decisive majority in favour of tax varying 
powers demonstrates a high level of altruism among the Scottish electorate, 
even although a number of surveys have shown that voters in Scotland are 
more likely to favour high public spending, and high taxation to pay for it, 
than are voters in the south of England (Pattie and Johnston 1990; Bennie et 
al 1997). There is also evidence that at least some Scottish voters were well 
aware that giving tax-varying powers to the new parliament could mean 
increased taxes in Scotland but were, nonetheless, prepared to support the 
proposal. Preliminary results from a survey of Scottish electors, which we 
carried out immediately after the referendum, show that, of those who voted 
and who agreed that devolution 'would mean extra taxes for Scotland', 45% 
(N=829) voted in favour of tax-varying powers (and 55% against). 
On the other hand, the tax-varying powers on offer for the new Scottish 
parliament are limited. The parliament is entitled to vary Scottish taxes by a 
modest 3 pence in the pound. Indeed, in what came to be seen as one of the 
few Labour gaffes of the 1997 general election, Tony Blair caused a furore in 
Scotland by making unguarded comments which were interpreted (if 
somewhat unfairly) by the media as suggesting that the powers of the 
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Scottish parliament were comparable to those of a parish council in England. 
Speculating a little, we might suggest that voting 'Yes' or 'No' to the tax 
question was actually used by voters as a means of expressing the strength of 
their support for the parliament. A 'No-No' vote expressed clear opposition, 
'Yes-No' a partial endorsement, and 'Yes-Yes' a full vote of confidence. 'Yes-
Yes' voters were voting for a parliament with teeth, we suspect, rather than 
necessarily for higher taxes and public spending. It was on the tax issue that 
the residual opposition to devolution seems to have expressed itself. The only 
two local authority areas to vote against taxation powers, Orkney (with 
47.4% voting for the measure), and Dumfries and Galloway (with 48.8% in 
favour) had both voted against devolution in 1979, as had other areas where 
the winning margin for the 1997 Yes to taxation powers vote was narrow, 
such as Borders (50.7%), Shetland (51.6%), Grampian (55.6%) and Tayside 
(57.0%). 
CONCLUSION 
The Scottish devolution referendum marked the end of an era. For most of 
the twentieth century, the home rule debate has formed a backdrop to 
Scottish politics (Mitchell 1997). While it has rarely dominated the political 
agenda in Scotland, it has always been just below the surface. The decisive 
'Yes-Yes' vote provides a clear mandate for a parliament which should be in 
place in Edinburgh by the year 2000, almost 300 years after the last Scottish 
parliament abolished itself. Moreover, the new parliament will be elected by 
a form of proportional representation - which will make it difficult for any 
single party to win a majority of seats - and could see the development of an 
entirely new style of politics. 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the decisive result, so markedly in 
contrast with the 1979 result, was largely a product of the experience of the 
preceding 18 years of Conservative government. Late in the referendum 
campaign, Mrs Thatcher kept a long-planned speaking engagement in 
Scotland. Such was the animus against her, seven years after she had left 
office, that a leading Scottish tabloid featured her photograph on its front 
page, along with the headline 'If you still need a reason to vote Yes: here's 
one'! 
The referendum achieved another purpose. The result confers an initial 
legitimacy on the Scottish parliament which might have been contested if the 
government had proceeded without a referendum. When the will of the 
people is expressed so clearly - and much more clearly than is possible in a 
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general election - it is difficult, in practical political terms, for opponents to 
think of reversing the policy at some future date. 
Our analysis has shown that when called upon to decide a constitutional issue 
the electorate can turn out in very reasonable numbers, even without very 
much stimulus in the form of local campaigning. But it also sounds a warning 
for future referendums planned by the government. The results were strongly 
related to the levels of support for the Conservative and Labour parties. This 
referendum was held early in the term of office of the new government. It 
was still enjoying a honeymoon with the electorate and Tony Blair was 
hugely popular while the Conservatives were weak and discredited in 
Scotland. It may be that if referendums are held when the government is less 
popular - as was the case in 1979 - then it may find it more difficult to get its 
proposals so massively endorsed. A fickle electorate can undermine 
constitutional innovation by referendum just as surely as it swept away 
objections to Scottish devolution. 
APPENDIX 
1. The electorates of the local authorities vary greatly in size. Glasgow, the 
largest, has an electorate of almost 480,00 while Orkney, the smallest, has 
just over 15,500 electors. As a result, the mean turnout for the 32 authorities 
differs from the overall national turnout. The same applies to other mean 
scores. 
2. Since the local authorities vary so much in size, but count equally as cases in 
correlation analysis, it is possible that our analysis gives too much weight to 
small authorities. We therefore calculated partial correlations controlling for 
the size of the electorate in an authority. In this analysis, the coefficients for 
turnout in local elections, % professional and managerial and % manual 
remain significant and that for % owner occupiers becomes significant. The 
coefficient for % Liberal Democrat in 1997 is no longer significant. 
3. As before, we checked these conclusions by calculating partial correlation 
coefficients controlling for the size of electorate. All of the coefficients are 
significant and are of the same order as in the simple bivariate analysis. 
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